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Recently, critics of the Uniform Commercial Code' have pro-
posed either revisions or federal enactment of the Code.2 These
critics have perceived the Code as failing to produce uniformity,
thereby creating unpredictable case law.' Some commentators
blame these problems on textual ambiguity in the Code,4 whereas
others suggest that Code language is inconsistent.5 If such lack of
uniformity exists, however, its principal cause is the failure to em-
ploy a standard or uniform methodology for both interpreting and
applying the Code.
Most lawyers are familiar with the numerous problems involved
in statutory interpretation. Two major problems that are some-
times understated in importance, however, are defining what is in-
volved in statutory interpretation and recognizing and describing
the various judicial methods of interpretation. This Article focuses
on the methodology for statutory interpretation of the Code. Spe-
cifically, the Article describes the various methodologies employed
at the time the Code was adopted, examines whether non-
uniformity and inconsistency have in fact occurred in Code deci-
sions, and addresses the sources of the potential lack of uniformity.
Examination of Code decisions discloses that most academic writ-
* Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law. B.A., University of Pittsburgh;
J.D., Duquesne University School of Law; LL.M., Yale Law School.
1. U.C.C. (1952). The subject of this Article is article 2 (sales) of the Uniform Commercial
Code, hereinafter referred to as the Code.
2. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 8 (2d ed. 1980); Taylor, Uniformity of Commercial Law and State-by-State Enact-
ment: A Confluence of Contradictions, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 337, 338 (1978); Thatcher, Battle of
the Forms: Solution by Revision of Section 2-207, 16 U.C.C. L.J. 237 (1984).
3. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 2, at 343; Thatcher, supra note 2, at 240.
4. For example, one critic suggests that although the Code looks comprehensive, it invites
significant differences in interpretation. Taylor, supra note 2, at 355.
5. Thatcher, supra note 2, at 240-41.
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ers, the practicing bar, and the judiciary have failed to apply a
standard Code interpretational methodology. The various method-
ologies that have been applied have resulted in inconsistent
decisions.
The failure of the profession to follow a uniform methodology
has been unfortunate for two reasons. First, a uniform methodol-
ogy in interpreting and applying a statute is a necessary condition
for producing uniformity in judicial decisions involving that stat-
ute.6 Second, the drafter of the Code, Karl N. Llewellyn, developed
a theory and a process of statutory interpretation that he incorpo-
rated into the Code. This "built-in" methodology, which grew out
of Llewellyn's efforts as a legal realist7 to develop an effective the-
ory of statutory interpretation, is the key to moving toward a uni-
form interpretation of the Code.
Llewellyn's approach to the Code involved the use of two tech-
niques: the use of the code form, and a particular drafting style
that grew out of his theory of statutory interpretation. First, Llew-
ellyn's choice of the code form in revising commercial law had im-
portant methodological consequences. This Article will develop the
thesis that a code requires a special methodology for interpretation
simply because it is generically a code rather than a "normal" stat-
ute. Although continental legal thinkers associate code methodol-
ogy with a different set of interpretational devices that are part of
the civil law, this Article does not advocate continental or civil law
methodology for Code interpretation. The author's position is that
the structure and form of codes make them different in kind from
most other statutes, thereby requiring a different methodology of
interpretation. In the case of the Code, not only did Llewellyn
choose that particular form, but he joined it to his new legal realist
theory of statutory drafting and interpretation. The resulting Code
is utterly unique, even among codes.
Second, Llewellyn's articles, memoranda, and speeches disclose
the evolution of a general theory about statutory interpretation
and the legal process. Llewellyn's drafting style evolved from his
theories about law and the legal process. His drafting included a
definite set of objectives, values, and procedural assumptions about
6. See infra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 102-14 and accompanying text.
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statutory interpretation and application. These assumptions,
objectives, and values did not enter the Code indirectly or covertly;
Llewellyn expressly and purposely incorporated them in his draft-
ing efforts. The Code is thus the first and perhaps the only statute
that incorporates legal realist notions of statutory drafting and in-
terpretation. It is the first legal realist statute. Legal realism,
through Llewellyn, produced the most distinctive feature of the
Code: a new, utterly unique methodology. If the legal profession
and the courts recognize and adopt that methodology, much of the
nonuniformity and unpredictability in judicial decisions interpret-
ing the Code will disappear.
II. DEFINING THE PROBLEM OF INTERPRETATION
A. Requirement of a Standard Methodology
The statutory nature of the Code furnishes an important reason
for using a standard methodology. The Code, like all statutes, is
not self-executing. Courts must apply its language to specific dis-
putes. Prior to this application, however, the court must determine
the meaning of the statute. Merely reading a statute does not al-
ways yield its meaning.' A court uses the process of interpretation
as one of the first, crucial steps in applying that statute to a dis-
pute.9 Interpretation is difficult, however, because it usually in-
volves finding another person's meaning from written words that
often "elude and betray meaning."10
Interpretation is closely related to statutory methodology.11 Lack
of a common methodology for interpreting and applying a statute,
especially a long and complex one, leads to nonuniformity in judi-
8. See Frankfurter, Statutory Construction, 3 VAND. L. REV. 365, 367 (1950).
9. See Beutel, Interpretation, Construction, and Revision of the Commercial Code: The
Presumption of Holding in Due Course, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 381, 386. Interpretation has
been described as "the process of determining the meaning of the words as they appear in
the statute as applied to the problem at hand." Id. at 386.
10. Frankfurter, supra note 8, at 366.
11. One meaning of the term statutory methodology is the customary technique courts
have used to interpret a statute. See F. BEUTEL, BRANNAN'S NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW
ANNOTATED, 60-102 (7th ed. 1948). The term has also been used to describe canons or rules
for interpretation. Id. at 93.
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cial decisions involving that statute. 2 Put another way, uniformity
in a particular area of the law requires two things: statutes with
the same wording, and court decisions in which cases on all fours
reach the same result.13 Uniformity of decision under a code espe-
cially requires uniform interpretation.' 4
B. Code Nonuniformity: Judicial Hostility Toward Relinquish-
ing the Common Law Tradition
Unfortunately, few analysts or courts have attempted to develop
an appropriate methodology for using the Code. Most commenta-
tors writing about the Code after it was enacted failed to even
mention the problem of methodology. Instead, they focused on
whether codification was needed at all,15 on textual exegesis of spe-
cific code sections,' 6 on changes from the common law of contracts
and the Uniform Sales Act,' 7 on reactions to specific cases decided
under the Code,'8 and on explaining "how to" accomplish specific
goals under the Code.' 9 Analysts who have examined substantive
law usually have developed narrow subject areas, often just a single
12. See Beutel, The Necessity of a New Technique of Interpreting the N.LL.-The Civil
Law Analogy, 6 TUL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1931).
13. Id. at 3.
14. See Hart, UCC Brief No. 2: Interpreting the Uniform Commercial Code, PRAC. LAW.,
Nov. 1986, at 39, 40; Diamond, Codification of the Law of Contract, 31 MOD. L. REV. 361,
382 (1968).
15. Franklin, On the Legal Method of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 330 (1951); Hawkland, Article 9 Methodology, 9 WAYNE L. REV. 531 (1963);
Kripke, The Principles Underlying the Drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1962 U.
ILL. L.F. 321.
16. Hawkland, Major Changes Under the Uniform Commercial Code in the Formation
and Terms of Sales Contracts, PRAC. LAW., May 1964, at 73; Weeks, Battle of the Forms
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 52 ILL. B.J. 660 (1964).
17. Gilbride, The Uniform Commercial Code: Impact on the Law of Contracts, 30
BROOKLYN L. REV. 177 (1964); Hawkland, supra note 16.
18. Comment, A Look at a Strict Construction of Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code from the Seller's Point of View or What's So Bad About Roto-Lith?, 8 AKRON L.
REV. 111 (1974); Case Comment, Sales-Uniform Commercial Code-"Acceptance" Vary-
ing Terms of Offer, 42 B.U.L. REV. 373 (1962); Note, Uniform Commercial Code: Variation
Between Offer and Acceptance Under Section 2-207, 1962 DuKE L.J. 613.
19. Davenport, How to Handle Sales of Goods: The Problem of Conflicting Purchase Or-
ders and Acceptance and New Concepts in Contract Law, 19 Bus. LAW. 75 (1963); Kove,
The "Battle of the Forms": A Proposal to Revise Section 2-207, 3 U.C.C. L.J. 7 (1970).
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code section. 0 The closest approach to examining appropriate
methodology for use and application of the Code has been a gen-
eral analysis of the drafter's jurisprudence.2
The courts have paid even less attention to developing a Code
methodology. This lack of attention is not surprising. Lawyers had
done the same thing with the Negotiable Instruments Law, the
predecessor of the Code.22 The refusal to abandon common law
case methodology or to consider that another methodology might
be necessary in interpreting the Negotiable Instruments Law was
one reason for the enactment of a reform statute-the Code.23
Many experts have observed the deep hostility of the common
law toward statutes,24 which is manifested by courts treating stat-
utes merely as innovations or exceptions to case law.2" Some ana-
lysts have observed that the source of this viewpoint was the
20. E.g., Duesenberg, Exiting from Bad Bargains Via Section 2-615: An Impractial
Dream, 13 U.C.C. L.J. 32 (1980); Hillman, Policing Contract Modifications under the UCC:
Good Faith and the Doctrine of Economic Duress, 64 IowA L. REV. 849 (1979); White, Allo-
cation of Scarce Goods Under Section 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial Code: A Compari-
son of Some Rival Models, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 503 (1979).
21. Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27
STAN. L. REV. 621 (1975). Professor Danzig's article is one of the classics on Code
jurisprudence.
22. UNiF. NEGO. INSTR. ACT, 5 U.L.A. 2 (1943). The Negotiable Instruments Act has been
superseded by the U.C.C. in all states.
23. Beutel states the problem:
On first blush the [Negotiable Instrument Law] itself may seem responsible;
but, as long as the courts and legal scholars continue to pursue the haphazard
method of seizing upon the first available technique of interpretation to reach
the result desired in a particular case, with no thought of the effect of such
practices upon the science of interpretation as a whole, and as long as the
courts stubbornly continue to rely upon the doctrine of stare decisis, just so
long may we expect to see all efforts at uniformity through codification lost in
a seething mass of conflicting cases.
Beutel, supra note 12, at 16-17 (emphasis in original).
24.
Indeed, statutes are in the main regarded as innovations on case law, to be
limited in their application; and after their enactment case law provides both
the wherewithal to fill gaps in their subject matter and the technique of inter-
preting what they cover-so much so that it is a legal commonplace that no
man knows what a statute means until the courts have "construed" it.
Herman, Llewellyn the Civilian: Speculations on the Contribution of Continental Experi-
ence to the Uniform Commercial Code, 56 TUL. L. REv. 1125, 1132 (1982) (quoting Llewel-
lyn, Case Law, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCEs 249, 249 (1930)).
25. "A code is intended to replace the earlier common law. How can one ensure that the
judges, brought up on the common law and familiar with it, will wipe out their knowledge of
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profound conservatism of judges, which led them to treat codes,
absent an unequivocal legislative intent to change the common
law, as merely modifications of the common law and equity. Judges
were particularly uncomfortable with problems involving statutory
interpretation because of their heavy orientation toward case anal-
ysis.2" Before enactment of the Code, several commentators recog-
nized these prejudices and attachments to the common law meth-
odology as serious hurdles that could obstruct successful
application of the Code.27
1. The 2-207 Examples
As the commentators had predicted, the courts employed com-
mon law methods of statutory interpretation in Code cases.2" The
well-known case Roto-Lith v. F.P. Bartlett & Co.29 exemplifies this
process. In Roto-Lith, the seller responded to an order form with
an acknowledgment form that disclaimed all warranties for the
goods sold. When a dispute arose because the goods were defective,
the court had to determine whether the disclaimer in the seller's
acknowledgment form relieved the seller of liability.30 The United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, applying Massachu-
setts law, determined that section 2-207 governed this "battle of
the cases from their memories and concentrate on the statutory words?" Diamond, supra
note 14, at 375-76.
26. There is an "undoubted prejudice against legislation felt by common lawyers." Dia-
mond, supra note 14, at 379. Statutes are seen as "enemy invaders." K. LLEWELLYN, THE
COMMON LAW TRADITION 39 (1960).
27.
There is some reason to be apprehensive about the fate of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code as it enters judicial arenas. . . . The great talent and skill that
Anglo-American lawyers and judges exhibit in the very difficult art of discover-
ing and using case law makes their general ineptitude in using statutory mate-
rial difficult to understand.
Hart, supra note 14, at 40. "Standard code methodology does not use the doctrine of stare
decisis, but that doctrine is so heavily entrenched in this country and has worked so well
that it undoubtedly will be used in construing the U.C.C." Hawkland, supra note 15, at 535.
28. The review of the several cases which follows is not intended to be exhaustive, but is
meant to illustrate some of the different ways in which the courts avoided the changes the
Code made to the commercial law.
29. 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962). The intention is not to rehash that case, but rather to
show that it was decided incorrectly because the court used common law methods to resolve
a problem of statutory or code interpretation.
30. Id. at 498-99.
U.C.C. METHODOLOGY
the forms."'" The court decided that the purpose of section 2-207
was to modify the common law "mirror image" rule, which pro-
vides that in order to constitute an acceptance, an offeree's reply
must agree with each and every term of the offer.3 2 Accordingly, a
response that did not in all particulars exactly match the offer
would constitute an acceptance as to the items that matched, and
a "counteroffer only as to the differences. 3 3 The court reasoned
that if the additional terms were "unilaterally burdensome" on the
offeror, and if the offeror was free to assent to them or not, then
the Code "would lead to an absurdity" because "[o]bviously no of-
feror will subsequently assent to such conditions."34 The court con-
cluded that "[t]o give the statute a practical construction we must
hold that a response which states a condition materially altering
the obligation solely to the disadvantage of the offeror is an 'ac-
ceptance. . . expressly. . . conditional on assent to the additional
S. .terms."'
This case is a perfect example of judicial hostility to a new stat-
ute changing the common law. It also illustrates several of the judi-
cial devices for avoiding statutory changes in the law which the
commentators noted had been used in the past e.3 First, the court
applied a fundamentally erroneous assumption to define the issue.
According to the court, the effect of section 2-207 is that a re-
sponse that does not correspond in all particulars to the offer be-
comes an acceptance as to the matching items and a "counteroffer
only as to the differences. 37 The court did not ask whether the
language of section 2-207 justifies the conclusion that the addi-
tional material automatically becomes a counteroffer.
Subsection (2) of section 2-207, however, provides that "[t]he
additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to
the contract. '3 8 Obviously, a proposal for addition to the contract
is not the same as a "counteroffer only as to the differences."
31. Id. at 499.
32. J. MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 54, at 110-11 (2d rev. ed. 1974).
33. Roto-Lith, 297 F.2d at 500.
34. Id.
35. Id. (quoting U.C.C. § 2-207(1)).
36. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
37. Roto-Lith, 297 F.2d at 500.
38. U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (1952) (emphasis added), cited in Roto-Lith, 297 F.2d at 499.
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Moreover, comment 2 appears to address directly the status of the
additional material: "Therefore, any additional matter contained
either in the writing intended to close the deal or in a later confir-
mation falls within subsection (2) and must be regarded as a pro-
posal for an added term unless the acceptance is made condi-
tional on the acceptance of the additional terms."39 Arguably, this
language, which appears to be mandatory or nearly so, was in-
tended to mean that so long as the acceptance is definite and sea-
sonable, then additional material is a proposal for addition, unless
the acceptance is expressly made conditional. Why did the court
fail to consider this interpretation, except to note that its decision
was required by "practical" considerations?40
An examination of the opinion reveals that the court used sev-
eral of the devices often used by common law courts to ignore or
avoid statutes. First, the court assumed, without considering rele-
vant statutory language, that any term in the response that was
not identical to the offer was automatically a counteroffer. The
common law response to the Roto-Lith facts would be that any
variance, no matter how minute, converted the entire response
from an offer into a counteroffer. A common law court, begrudg-
ingly responding to a statute that changed this law, would retain
the use of the automatic counteroffer rule for all material that did
not fit exactly into the new statutory acceptance concept. This is
precisely what the court in Roto-Lith did. Despite the clear lan-
guage of subsection (2) and the reinforcement of comment 2, the
court gave the scope of the counteroffer concept exactly the same
breadth and strength that it had at common law.
In fact, as to additional terms in the response under 2-207, the
court in Roto-Lith employed the last shot doctrine. That doctrine,
a corollary of the common law mirror image rule, provides that if
the original offeror acted in connection with the transaction that
was the subject of the offer and counteroffer, he would be held to
have accepted the counteroffer.4' According to the court in Roto-
Lith, the addition of terms that favored the offeree converted the
39. U.C.C. § 2-207 comment 2 (emphasis added).
40. Roto-Lith, 297 F.2d at 500.
41. Hawkland, supra note 16, at 82.
[Vol. 29:341
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entire acceptance into a counteroffer. 42 If the parties thereafter ac-
ted as though there were a contract, then it was on the terms of
the counteroffer.43 In reaching this result, the court employed com-
mon law statutory methodology and gave the narrowest possible
scope to the language of the Code.
Roto-Lith was not the only section 2-207 case to reflect this type
of reasoning in interpreting the Code. In Gilbert & Bennett Manu-
facturing Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,44 the seller's form
acknowledgment contained a warranty disclaimer and limitation of
remedy clause. When the goods did not function according to their
description, the buyer brought an action for breach of warranty.
The seller responded that, based on the language of his disclaimer,
no warranties had been given. After acknowledging that section 2-
207 controlled, the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts held that the seller's response was a counteroffer
and the buyer had to give notice of objection to the seller's terms
in order to avoid them.45 Roto-Lith was the only authority cited to
support this conclusion.46 Evidently, the court in Gilbert & Ben-
nett believed that no explanation was necessary. Instead of consid-
ering the language of the Code, as it was required to do, the court
simply found an invalid precedent and relied on it. 47 This was one
more device to avoid the surrender of earlier concepts of contract
formation and methodology.
42. Roto-Lith, 297 F.2d at 500.
43. Id.
44. 445 F. Supp. 537 (D. Mass. 1977).
45. Id. at 545-46.
46. Id. at 546.
47. At this preliminary stage of analysis and explanation, analyzing this case in terms of
the methodology suggested in this Article is inappropriate. The court nonetheless should
have made some obvious inquiries suggested by the plain language of section 2-207. First,
the court should have asked whether under subsection 2-207(1) the seller had made a sea-
sonable acceptance or had expressly made acceptance conditional on assent to the seller's
terms. Second, the court should have asked whether the change was material under 2-207,
and it should have explored whether the comments provide a means to define "material."
The court ignored these issues plainly posed by the statutory text and comments and relied
instead on a precedent that assumed the continued existence of the pre-code common law of
contract formation.
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In Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Flexible Tubing Corp.,48 the United
States District Court for the District of Connecticut, in dicta,49
went one step further than the Gilbkrt & Bennett opinion. In
Beech Aircraft, the buyer sent an order to which the seller re-
sponded with an acknowledgment form that contained a warranty
disclaimer. The goods were defective, and the seller took the posi-
tion that the warranty disclaimer relieved him of liability. Relying
on the Roto-Lith decision, the court stated:
The Uniform Commercial Code today expressly provides that a
confirmation which contains additional terms may constitute an
acceptance unless the new terms materially alter the offer. An
additional clause negating standard warranties is considered to
"materially alter" the offer. A confirmation similar to that in
the instant case would accordingly constitute a counteroffer
even under the Code.50
After reciting the language of 2-207, the court announced, without
explanation, that the Code language meant the same as the com-
mon law on the subject of counteroffers."' Although the court re-
lied on the holding in Roto-Lith, it also assumed the broadest im-
aginable interpretation of that precedent in order to support its
assertion that the new Code and earlier common law were
indistinguishable.
2. Code Coverage Examples
Many courts have retained old methodologies of statutory inter-
pretation in cases that involve the scope or coverage of the Code.52
For example, the test for whether a contract involves goods or ser-
48. 270 F. Supp. 548 (D. Conn. 1967).
49. The parties conceded that the Uniform Sales Act controlled. Id. at 557 n.3.
50. Id. at 558 n.4 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
51. Id. The Beech Aircraft opinion gives every indication of the court's belief that the
Roto-Lith decision merely restated the common law. In the text of the opinion, the court
announced that a purported acceptance with new warranty terms "constitutes a rejection
and a counteroffer." Id. at 558 (citing Riverside Coal Co. v. Elman Coal Co., 114 Conn. 492,
159 A. 280 (1932); Poel v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 216 N.Y. 310, 110 N.E. 619
(1915)). Shortly thereafter the court cited Roto-Lith for the same proposition. Id. at 558-59
& 559 n.5. The inescapable conclusion is that the court equated the law as to counteroffers
in the Riverside Coal and Poel cases, both of which are classic common law offer-accept-
ance-counteroffer cases, with the law announced in Roto-Lith.
52. The intended scope of the Code is found in §§ 2-102, 2-103, 2-105, and 2-106.
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vices was stated in Bonebrake v. Cox as "whether [its] predomi-
nant factor, [its] thrust, [its] purpose, reasonably stated, is the ren-
dition of service, with goods incidentally involved . . . or is a
transaction of sale, with labor incidentally involved. . ." 5 This
method of dealing with issues of Code coverage involves stereotypi-
cal common law thinking; that is, the transaction is characterized,
pigeonholed, or labeled as a certain type. The type determines the
outcome. Conflicts of laws scholars have almost unanimously de-
nounced this characterization process. 4 Most conflicts scholars
agree that the characterization device creates two serious
problems. First, its deceptive simplicity of use lends it a false air of
certainty and consistency, when in fact it is limited or useless as a
test and leads to unpredictable and inconsistent results.5 Second,
the device conceals the true basis for the decision by permitting
choices based on other considerations to be made as part of the
characterization device, so that the true reason for the decision is
not apparent. 6
In Epstein v. Giannattasio,5 7 the Connecticut Court of Common
Pleas explained the rationale for this approach to Code scope
cases. The court stated that the "determinant [of whether the
53. 499 F.2d 951, 960 (8th Cir. 1974). Accord Ranger Constr. Co. v. Dixie Floor Co., 433 F.
Supp. 442 (D.S.C. 1977); Snyder v. Herbert Greenbaum & Assocs., 38 Md. App. 144, 380
A.2d 618 (1977). All three cases involved the purchase of flooring that the seller was to
install.
54. R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 205-16 (1968) ("characterization is . . . em-
ployed to cover up actual choice-of-law reasons"); R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CON-
FLICT OF LAws 39-64 (1971) (describing the characterization process as a pervasive problem).
55. R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 54, at 40-45.
56. According to Leflar,
It is evident ... that the characterization process is not in practice a purely
mechanical one, nor one which is complete within itself .... If more than one
characterization is logically available for a set of facts, and constitutionally
permissible, the choice between the characterizations may turn on a judicial
desire to achieve justice in the particular case, on a public policy preference for
one rule of law over another, on a preference for the forum state's own rule of
law, or on something else other than pure logic.
[ . I]t is apparent that the characterization technique is being used to
achieve results that must be justified, if at all, by other real reasons. That
other real reasons exist cannot be doubted. The only questions that remain are
what the real reasons are, and why a cover-up device should be manipulated to
conceal them.
R. LEFLAR, supra note 54, at 212-13 (footnote omitted).
57. 25 Conn. Supp. 109, 197 A.2d 342 (1963).
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Code applies] is . . . the intention of the parties. . . . That inten-
tion is to be ascertained from the language used, interpreted in the
light of the situation of the parties and the circumstances sur-
rounding them. '58 This test-the standard contract formation
baseline, or the intent of the parties-is clearly irrelevant in this
context. That is, the parties do not think in terms of goods or ser-
vices, and hence have no intent at all on the subject of whether
they are formulating a contract for goods or one for services. In
this context, intent is a fiction. This test, in its assumption that
the parties have such an intent, furnishes a rationale for the char-
acterization device imposed by the courts.
Other courts have openly stated their preference for earlier law.
For example, in Carroll v. Grabavoy,59 the court concluded that
because the language of the Code was "similar" to that of the Uni-
form Sales Act, the predecessor of the Code, it saw "no basis" to
change the test for the scope of the Code's coverage.6 0 The court
failed to consider the structure of the Code, the other applicable
sections, the comments, or the policy enunciated in the Code. In-
stead, it simply assumed, on the basis of the "similarity" of some
statutory language, that the Code test and the Uniform Sales Act
test were the same.6 ' The most cursory examination of these
sources would have revealed that the Code was not intended
merely to reenact the provisions on coverage of the Uniform Sales
Act.62
A more obvious example of retention of common law reasoning
and refusal to employ a modern statutory methodology occurred in
Allen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.63 The United States District
58. Id. at 113, 197 A.2d at 344 (quoting United Aircraft Corp. v. O'Connor, 141 Conn. 530,
107 A.2d 398 (1954)).
59. 77 Ill. App. 3d. 895, 396 N.E.2d 836 (1979).
60. Id. at 899, 396 N.E.2d at 839.
61. Id.
62. For example, comment 1 to § 2-101 states that article 2 is a complete revision of the
Uniform Sales Act and that the coverage of this article "is much more extensive than that of
the old Sales Act." U.C.C. § 2-101 comment 1 (1952). This comment directly contradicts the
court's conclusion in Carroll. It is difficult to understand how the court could overlook this
language without even inquiring whether it might effect some change in coverage. The effect
of this comment language under any theory of statutory interpretation should have been to
prompt a court to inquire whether the new statute had changed the scope of coverage of the
sales law.
63. 387 F. Supp. 364 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
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Court for the Southern District of Texas had to decide whether a
drug given as a sample to a physician and subsequently dispensed
to a patient fell within the Code. In determining whether the
transaction constituted a sale for purposes of the Code, the court
used a traditional common law test for consideration: whether the
promisor had received a benefit or the promisee had incurred a
detriment.6 4 The Code defines a sale as "the passing of title from
the seller to the buyer for a price,' 65 but whether the Code in-
tended to retain the common law consideration test as the
equivalent of the term "price" is a fair question. The court in Al-
len simply assumed that price was synonymous with consideration.
It assumed that the common law test was the best way to resolve a
question under the Code, without considering whether the Code
intended to retain this test. 6
The observations made in connection with the Carroll case are
also applicable here." More specifically, section 2-304 and com-
ment 2 address the specific issue of the Allen case. 8 Why then did
the court fail even to mention this section and its comment? The
answer is that common law habits of interpreting statutes resist
change.
The criticism of the cases analyzed thus far has focused princi-
pally on specific errors in interpretation made by each court. How-
ever, the courts also committed a common error. They failed to
perceive that in addition to substantive changes in the content of
64. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 134-35 (2d ed. 1977); E. FARNs-
WORTH, CONTRACTS 41-42 (1982). The court in Allen ruled that "[a]ny benefit incurred by
the defendant is fortuitous only" and that there was no evidence that "by accepting the
sample the plaintiff incurred any legal detriment." Allen, 387 F. Supp. at 368.
65. U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (1952).
66. Another area in which the courts have maintained common law methods of interpre-
tation is in determining whether a farmer is a merchant under the Code. Several of these
cases are analyzed in McDonnell, Purposive Interpretation of the Uniform Commercial
Code: Some Implications for Jurisprudence, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 795 (1978). McDonnell
found that the plain meaning rule was the major common law device used by the courts in
such cases. Id. at 801-09.
67. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
68. "The price can be made payable in money or otherwise. If it is payable in whole or in
part in goods each party is a seller of the goods which he is to transfer." U.C.C. § 2-304(1).
"Under subsection (1) the provisions of this Article are applicable to transactions where the
price of goods is payable in something other than money." Id. comment 2.
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commercial law, the new Code included and required a new meth-
odology for interpreting and applying it.
III. LLEWELLYN'S INFLUENCE ON THE CODE
The fact that the Code was drafted almost entirely by Karl N.
Llewellyn is profoundly significant. His influence was so pervasive
that the Code has been referred to as the "Lex Llewellyn." 9 The
assistant reporter for the Code described the degree to which the
Code reflected Llewellyn's ideas as "startling. 7 0 Other Code ex-
perts agree that Llewellyn's ideas are the most fundamental and
formative influence on the Code. 1 Llewellyn rejected traditional
legal thinking about case and statutory methods, and after years of
studying and teaching commercial law and jurisprudence, he also
rejected the substance of the commercial statutes of his time. One
of his principal reactions was rejection of existing commercial case
and statutory method. 2
A. Llewellyn's Use of the Code Form
The use of the code form was in itself one of the most important
aspects of Llewellyn's drafting. Codification has certain important
procedural implications." Moreover, in the case of the U.C.C.,
Llewellyn's efforts produced a code with many features that were
unique, even for a code.
Before the Code was adopted, a controversy arose over what
form the new commercial law should take. Many recognized that
the code form used in Europe entailed major differences in meth-
odology.7 4 Only after considerable debate over the merits and de-
merits of codification did Llewellyn draft in code form. 5 He did so
69. Franklin, supra note 15, at 330.
70. Mentschikoff, Highlights of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 MOD. L. REV. 167, 168
n.3 (1964).
71. Danzig, supra note 21, at 621-23.
72. W. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 303-04 (1973).
73. 1 STATE OF NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE, 41 (1955). Many experts maintain that the Code differs generically from both
common law decisional and common law statutory methodology. See id.
74. J. JACKSON & L. BOLLINGER, CONTRACT LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 141-52 (2d ed. 1980).
75. See Hillman, Construction of the Uniform Commercial Code: UCC Section 1-103 and
Code Methodology, 18 B.C.L. REV. 655, 655-60 (1977).
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deliberately, in order to resolve problems associated with then-ex-
isting commercial law.7 6
A code has been defined as an "orderly and authoritative state-
ment of the leading rules of law on a given subject."7 7 It is selec-
tive, comprehensive, and unified.7 These are terms of art. Authori-
tative means that a code is legislatively enacted; selective means
that it states only the leading rules; comprehensive means that it
states all of the leading rules; and unified means that it speaks
completely on a given subject."
The most important attribute of the code form is probably or-
derliness, which is also one of its most distinctive features. Orderli-
ness means the reduction of an entire area of law to a complete
system, which requires orderly arrangement of principles and rules,
and maintenance of consistency among various sections of the stat-
ute relative to the subject area covered."' In a code, this orderliness
and systemization are so strongly maintained that individual code
sections are only "relatively independent" of each other.8 1 Orderli-
ness in a code can be established in several fashions.
First, most codes either state exceptions to specific rules within
the text of that rule or refer to exceptions in cross references to
other sections. Second, many codes have supereminent or "safety
valve" provisions to modify the harsh results that the general rules
within a code periodically produce. Third, to maintain orderliness
in a code, the underlying policies of the various provisions and sec-
tions usually are compatible with each other. 2 Fourth, orderliness
requires that the code provide for keeping the subject area of the
statute current and for filling gaps in the statute.8 3
76. 1 STATE OF NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION, supra note 73, at 37, 87. "[I]n his
approach were certain attitudes towards and ideas about codification, and in other contexts,
notably in teaching jurisprudence, he often discussed the ideas of Savigny, Carter, Field,
and other leading participants in debates about codification." W. TWINING, supra note 72, at
308.
77. Goodrich, Restatement and Codification, in FIELD CENTENARY ESSAYS 241, 243 (1959).
78. 1 STATE OF NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION, supra note 73, at 37.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 65-66.
81. Franklin, supra note 15, at 337.
82. 1 STATE OF NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION, supra note 73, at 66.
83. Hawkland, Uniform Commercial Code Methodology, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 291, 299-300.
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The most distinctive devices used to achieve orderliness are co-
ordination and superordination.8 ' Coordination means that provi-
sions of a code refer to one another and remain consistent when
more than one statutory provision may be applicable.85 Super-
ordination provides methods for handling competing and conflict-
ing principles or rules in the text of the code. 6 This type of con-
flict between more than one potentially applicable portion of a
statute is especially likely to occur in a code because the code at-
tempts to deal comprehensively with an entire area of law.
Although Llewellyn supported codification, he did not become
embroiled in the controversy on that subject.'  His approach was
pragmatic and treated codification as a tool to solve a particular
problem at a particular historic moment.8 The clear defects of the
prior commercial statutes, such as the Uniform Sales Act, were a
principal source of Llewellyn's support for codification.89 Llewel-
lyn's long study of commercial law and his practical experience
with the problems of business made him critical of the fairness and
effectiveness of existing commercial law, of the proficiency of the
bar practicing in that area, and of the ability of existing commer-
cial law to meet the needs of the business community. He argued
that lack of knowledge about commercial law was so widespread
that many "expert" commercial lawyers' knowledge consisted of
"smug, flat ignorance." 90
84. Id. at 301.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. W. TWINING, supra note 72, at 310-11.
88. Id. at 311.
89. Memorandum of Karl N. Llewellyn to Executive Committee on Scope and Program of
the NCC Section on Uniform Commercial Acts [hereinafter Llewellyn Memorandum], re-
printed in W. TWINING, supra note 72, at 524-26.
90. Statement of Karl N. Llewellyn to New York Law Revision Commission (1954) [here-
inafter Llewellyn Statement], reprinted in W. TWINING, supra note 72, at 537.
No person associated with the undertaking had at the outset any remotest sus-
picion of how deep, how widespread was ignorance of our commercial law
among both our bar and our business community; still less did any man have
suspicion of how much of the "knowledge" of many "experts" was smug, flat
ignorance-ignorance dangerous also to their clients.
[Vol. 29:341356
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Moreover, Llewellyn realized that the existing source of commer-
cial law, the Uniform Sales Act,91 had become totally outdated.92
He argued that commercial statutes pose a particular problem:
they must be kept current, but the legislature does not have the
time, energy, or means of reaching agreement on such changes on a
frequent basis. Further, if the legislature does amend the commer-
cial statute, it does a patchwork job.93 Llewellyn perceived that en-
acting a new commercial statute in code form could help solve this
problem. 94
91. U.L.A., vols 1 & 1A, Sales (1950). The Uniform Sales Act was produced by the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The National Conference,
founded in 1889, has as its objective "to promote uniformity in state laws on all subjects
where uniformity is deemed desirable and practical." HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFER-
ENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE 35TH ANNUAL
MEETING (1925). The conference has written and continues to produce uniform statutes on a
variety of subjects, which are then adopted one at a time by states that choose to do so.
Prior to the time the U.C.C. was first promulgated, the National Conference had produced
seven commercial statutes that had been adopted by numerous states. At the time the
U.C.C. was drafted, it had been "recognized for some years" that these commercial statutes
needed substantial revision to keep them in step with commercial practice and to integrate
them with one another. GENERAL COMMENT OF NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, 1 UL.A., at xvi (master ed. 1976).
92.
The actual historical reasons for undertaking the Code have their own further
and independent powerful punch.
Much of the law, whether embodied in the original Uniform Commercial
Acts or not, has become outmoded as the nature of business, of technology,
and of financing has changed. Such law needs to be brought up to date.
Llewellyn Statement, supra note 90.
93.
The third thing which our Acts have not yet done, is to recanvass their own
work, each in the light of the other and of all experience since the
drafting....
If one sets the pending Amendments to the Negotiable Instruments Act
against such a background, he finds their whole theory to be unwise. They were
intended as, and were prepared as, patchwork.
Llewellyn Memorandum, supra note 89, at 527.
94.
Yet the great fact of policy remains: if American enterprise is to develop as a
free economy, then the rules of the game must be known, and they must there-
fore be made readily knowable. They must be made as simple (though ade-
quate) and also as easy to know, as the best legal engineering can make them.
That the Code does.
Llewellyn Statement, supra note 90, at 537.
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Llewellyn also argued forcefully that the existing uniform com-
mercial statutes were deeply flawed in conception and structure.95
Much of this problem arose because the various Uniform Acts were
prepared one by one. This process resulted in a lack of coordina-
tion, manifested by conflicts and discrepancies between the Acts,
and by gaps in coverage."6 The cumulative result of these deficien-
cies was problems that "leaped across the 'boundaries' of the tradi-
tional 'fields' of law."'97
Llewellyn also argued that the Uniform Acts were needlessly
complex in the areas of law they did cover.9 He identified two as-
pects of the problem of complexity. First, the Uniform Acts were
so complex that they were useless except to specialized lawyers.99
Second, the verbal formulas used in the Uniform Acts did not fit
situations that usually occurred in areas governed by the Acts.100
This led to uncertainty, unpredictability, and confusion. Llewellyn
95. Id. at 538-39.
96. Id. at 539.
97. Id.
But why in the form of a Code? In the first place, experience has shown wide
and unhappy gaps to exist between the existing Acts. ... Sound revision any-
where proved to call for thinking through and for testing out the bearings on
all other sectors ...(Such thinking through would never have occurred save
in the process of a whole-job...
The Code, therefore, calls for adoption as an integrated whole, whose parts
supplement, support, mutually affect and balance one another.
Id. at 538-39.
98. Id. at 538.
99. Llewellyn Memorandum, supra note 89, at 526. "By this I mean the heaping up of
technical language and of qualifications. I speak with conviction of sin: no man working for
the Conference has ever produced a more complex piece of wording than the Trust Receipts
Act." Id. Llewellyn was also concerned that this drafting for specialists meant that "the law
which governs our commerce and commercial finance is substantially unknown to most law-
yers, whether they need to know it or not, and is almost wholly unknown to most business
men." Llewellyn Statement, supra note 90, at 536 (emphasis in original).
100. Llewellyn Statement, supra note 90, at 538.
[T]he existing law can sometimes point up clearly how not to make law, wher-
ever simplicity has been sought by way of some mere word-formula which does
not fit the situation and the situation's set of problems. ...
Where operation and results are today scrambled and unreliable even though
the word-formula looks simple, then what is needed is to re-examine the
problems and the material and to come out with language which really fits the
need.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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concluded that codification of the commercial law would eliminate
these problems. 0 1
B. Llewellyn and Legal Realism
1. The Legal Realists
Llewellyn's philosophy and his theory of statutory drafting were
important factors in his decision to draft in code form. Llewellyn
was one of the major thinkers in the mode of legal analysis known
as legal realism. 10 2 Legal realism was a reaction to the jurispru-
dence of the nineteenth century, and was the successor to the soci-
ological school of jurisprudence. 0 s The realists rejected the nine-
teenth-century idea that law consisted of a complete, symmetrical
set of general and self-contained doctrines or premises. They also
objected to the corollary of that view, which held that the correct-
ness of a judicial decision should be measured by its consistency
with some set of overarching general premises.0 The realists ar-
gued that this notion of law as an abstract, fixed body of general
rules or doctrines was incorrect and misleading. They maintained
instead that law was dynamic and reflected social fact. Thus, as
society changed, law would also change, and any equilibrium
reached between existing law and social fact was only temporary.
The realists also believed that the traditional view of law was mis-
leading, because it purported to explain decisions in terms of gen-
eral rules in judicial opinions. The realists argued that this style of
explanation concealed the true reasons for the outcome. They con-
tended that in most cases, the decision was the reaction of a par-
ticular judge to a particular set of facts.0 5 According to the real-
101. "Thus, regardless of the history, the result is clear: With the Code, the law of com-
merce and commercial finance becomes relatively quick to find, to understand, and to use.
This is a typical example of the point made above about the unplanned values of good
tools." Id. at 537.
102. White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social
Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 VA. L. REv. 999, 1017 (1972).
103. Id. at 1020-26.
104. Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037, 1038-39 (1961).
105.
A judge's holding in a case is an ad hoc response to a unique state of facts,
rationalized, after the event, with a dissimulation more or less conscious, and
fitted willy-nilly into the Procrustean bed of approved doctrine. The motiva-
1988]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
ists, the principal value of a case was in the actual decision-given
a particular set of facts, Smith won and Jones lost-and not in the
court's after-the-fact rationalization in the form of a judicial
opinion. 106
This description identifies several important themes or concerns
of the legal realists. One was the necessity for a narrowing of focus
in the study of legal decisions. This change in focus had several
important consequences. First, it led the realists to emphasize the
significance of the study of individual cases. 107 Quite naturally, this
study of single cases drew attention to concrete instances of rules
in action, as applied by the courts.' This focus, in turn, led the
realists to concentrate on what courts actually do, as opposed to
what they ought to do, and to focus on the specific result in a case
rather than on abstract general doctrine or rule formulation. l0 9
Realists also attempted to identify subjective, psychological ele-
ments in judicial decisions. 110
The second result of the realists' study of specific cases was rec-
ognition of the importance of factual matters in judicial decisions,
especially in understanding how a rule of law was applied. Empha-
sizing the importance of this insight, Llewellyn explained:
A further line of attack on the apparent conflict and uncer-
tainty among the decisions in appellate courts has been to seek
more understandable statements of them by grouping the facts
in new-and typically but not always narrower-categories. The
search is for correlations of fact-situation and outcome which
(aided by common sense) may reveal when courts seize on one
rather than another of the available competing premises."'
A third aspect of realism emphasized the study of judicial deci-
sions. This realist focus combined with a consciousness of judicial




107. Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARv. L. REV. 697, 707 (1931).
108. Id. at 710.
109. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARv. L.
REV. 1222, 1236-41 (1931).
110. Id. at 1238-39.
111. Id. at 1240 (emphasis in original).
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motivations and psychology to produce an awareness of judicial
creation and change of law.112 The perception that judges con-
sciously or unconsciously manipulated rules in specific cases led to
a conception of law in flux.113 According to the realists, not only
was law continually changing, but it was absolutely essential that
such change occur. They explained that law had to be continually
re-examined to ascertain its compatibility with changing economic
conditions." 4 It is a small step from this position to the position
that, in applying the law, the courts were peculiarly well adapted
to keep that law abreast of changing social and economic condi-
tions in a way that was simply not possible for a legislature.
2. Llewellyn's Realist Approach to Commercial Law
Although Llewellyn shared many of the ideas and concerns com-
mon to all realists, he developed his own unique realist approach
from his work as a teacher and writer on commercial law. He ex-
pounded his own approach to commercial law in a series of major
law review articles on the subject in the 1930s and early 1940s. A
major theme of those writings was exposition of the realist idea
that common law approaches to commercial law were flawed be-
cause they were overly concerned with legal doctrine and abstract
ideas about obligation." 5
First, Llewellyn argued that this approach was static and failed
to explain the outcomes in many cases." 6 Second, he asserted that
the approach led courts to create legal doctrine that was inconsis-
tent with commercial reality, and that the business community
perceived that inconsistency. For example, Llewellyn perceived
major differences in how businessmen and lawyers approached the
idea of obligation and contract enforceability. He demonstrated
this divergence by contrasting a businessman's understanding of
the performance due under a contract with the understanding of a
112. Id. at 1236.
113. Id.
114. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 705,
710-14 (1931).
115. Llewellyn, Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer & Acceptance II, 48 YALE L.J. 779, 780-
81 (1939).
116. Llewellyn, supra note 109, at 1239.
1988]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
judge or lawyer. 117 Llewellyn perceived that legal understanding of
obligation due under a contract was unidimensional; it identified a
single, usually exclusive method and quantity of services or goods
required by the contract terms, and only that precise performance
would satisfy the obligor's duty. On the other hand, business
thinking about contract obligation stressed that the obligation cre-
ated by a contract was flexible, even after agreement had been
reached. Thus, instead of thinking in terms of a single, fixed per-
formance, businessmen tended to think in terms of several flexible
alternatives. A business understanding usually encompassed a
range of permissible satisfactory performances."' This business
understanding of contract obligation was diametrically opposed to
that of the legal system.
Llewellyn argued that the ignorance of judges, lawyers, and legal
writers about business custom and usage was a disastrous short-
coming, because he believed that business thinking, custom, and
practice were inherently one of the principal sources of commercial
law. He wrote:
"Every fact-pattern of common life ... carries within itself its
appropriate, natural rules, its right law. This is a natural law
which is real. It rests on the solid foundation of what reason can
recognize in the nature of man and of the life conditions of the
time and place . . . indwelling in the very circumstances of
life."" 9
117. Contrasting the two interpretations, Llewellyn wrote:
What the law official will enforce is what he sees as the legal obligation. An
agreement that to a business man calls for shipment of goods as close as conve-
niently possible to those described, with . . . price adjustment for defective
deliveries, and return only of unusables, and replacement of those-this agree-
ment means to a court that the seller is to comply with the description pre-
cisely, or have no rights at all.
Llewellyn, supra note 114, at 722.
118. Id. at 722-23 n.45.
119. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 26, at 122 (quoting Goldschmidt, Preface to Kritik des
Entwurfs eines Handelsgesetzbuchs, 4 KRIT. ZEITSCHR. F.D. GES. RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT, No.
4). This excerpt is from a later book, but it fairly summarizes a basic theme in Llewellyn's
writing after 1930. Llewellyn also stated:
The prior installment moved upon the premise that case-law doctrine in Con-
tract is built around the facts of adjudication, and is likely both to reflect life-
conditions and to stay moderately close to them. When in doubt whether a
given body of Contract doctrine is case-law doctrine, one very hopeful ap-
proach is to examine the fact-conditions to which that doctrine purports to
[Vol. 29:341
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Thus, Llewellyn reasoned that law was "immanent" in business
practice, and that legal decisions ignoring this reality lost touch
with one of the most important sources of law in a mature com-
mercial or industrial economy 120 He argued that the legal system's
failure to recognize business reality in the form of trade custom,
practice, and business modes of thinking about obligation and con-
tract would cause commercial law to become irrelevant and use-
less-irrelevant because businessmen would ignore it and refuse to
use it in planning, useless because businessmen would not use it to
settle disputes. 2'
Llewellyn argued that if legal principles did not change concomi-
tantly with commercial practice, the law would become hopelessly
outmoded 122 and would soon operate as an impediment to commer-
cial activity instead of as a tool to promote and enhance it.123 He
offered the distinction made by the first Restatement of Contracts
between unilateral and bilateral contracts 124 as a perfect example
of the effect of this failure to integrate commercial law and busi-
ness reality 125 Llewellyn argued that no one in business, com-
merce, or industry had ever thought about agreements in the man-
apply. If it fits those conditions, it is likely to fit the cases, more or less
roughly; if it does not, it is not. This installment moves upon the hypothesis
that the orthodox analysis of Offer and Acceptance (even in the business
field). does not well fit the fact-conditions.
Llewellyn, supra note 115, at 779-80.
120. Llewellyn, supra note 115, at 779-80.
121. See id. at 779-80, 788-89.
122. Llewellyn, supra note 114, at 722 n.45. "Today's policy and principle will be out-
dated, doubtless, within a generation. But guidance it gives when, and as long as, it fits the
facts. And surely the lesson remains that policy and principle must fit the facts, and must
be rebuilt to fit the changing facts." Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality and Society, 37
COLuM. L. REV. 341, 409 (1937).
123. See Llewellyn, supra note 114, at 751.
124. The first Restatement adopted the common-law distinction: "A unilateral contract is
one in which no promisor receives a promise as consideration for his promise. A bilateral
contract is one in which there are mutual promises between two parties to the contract; each
party being both a promisor and a promisee." RESTATEMENT (FIRsT) OF CONTRACTS § 12
(1932). For brief descriptions of the terms "bilateral" and "unilateral," see J. CALAMARI & J.
PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 17-18 (3d ed. 1987); E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 64, at 109-
110; J. MURRAY, supra note 32, at 9-11.
125. "Meantime the Great Dichotomy continues in classroom practice to divide the sup-
posed problems of formation into two mutually exclusive categories, 'unilateral' and
'bilateral' But with this difference: that the classical dichotomy. has little relation to the
living fact of the business contracting which it divides." Llewellyn, supra note 115, at 789.
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ner of the Restatement, and that it was unlikely anyone ever
would.' 26
Llewellyn's rejection of broadly formulated doctrine also led him
to realize the importance of factual matters in the decision and
analysis of cases. Like the other realists, Llewellyn argued that the
common law and the Restatement had totally ignored the signifi-
cance of facts in legal analysis. 1  Other realists had recognized
that this omission was the result of the sweeping, doctrinal analysis
emphasized in the common law approach,'12  but Llewellyn ex-
plained how this doctrinal emphasis, coupled with the common law
method of case-by-case development, resulted in a complicated
and overblown elaboration of basic rules. He also demonstrated
that overelaboration contributed to confusion and lack of
predictability.129
Llewellyn argued that the common law treatment of offer and
acceptance was an example of this confusion. He maintained that
both concepts had been elaborated in countless cases to the point
that they were of no explanatory or predictive value at all.13 0 Judi-
126. "In the bilateral situation the first and outstanding fact of life is that outside of
lunatic asylums real people do not in good faith offer 'a promise for a promise'." Llewellyn,
supra note 115, at 789. "At the other pole is the approach which common horse sense would
urge, on business facts. It does not look for any single line of acceptance." Id. at 788. "[T]he
classical dichotomy in Offer and Acceptance has little relation to the living fact of the busi-
ness contracting which it divides." Id. at 789.
127. Llewellyn, On Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance I, 48 YALE L.J. 1, 1-
17 (1938).
128. Llewellyn, supra note 114, at 750.
129. See id.
130.
And the chief reason why this phase [offer and acceptance] of the law of busi-
ness agreement continues unnecessarily obscure, and troublesome, and more
often unpredictable than Reason would allow, is that the sustained illumina-
tion of point after point after point has been presented with a certain almost
desperate regularity as a series of minor qualifications of basic theories and of
a basic analysis which have not for a century or so rested on either case-law or
on sense, and yet have not been re-examined in the light of their incessant and
effective partial challenges. When the qualifications needed to make a suppos-
edly simple basic structure of theory give accurate results in practice reach the
point where the simplicity is overwhelmed by its own qualifications, and when
the qualifications are not made to cohere in theory, though they do in meaning,
then a fresh start becomes over-due.
Llewellyn, supra note 127, at 1.
Perhaps it is time to recanvass the [cases] ....
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cial opinions that involved those concepts simply selected from the
numerous and often inconsistent versions of the doctrines available
in hundreds of reported cases. Because those precedents were usu-
ally couched in broad doctrinal terms, opinions that drew on these
holdings often confused or concealed the operative factors that in-
fluenced the court to render a particular decision." 1
Llewellyn maintained that the traditional approach failed to ex-
plain the significance and effect of the facts, 32 and he stressed that
because of this shortcoming, common law opinions failed to ex-
plain or justify many decisions in spite of purporting to do So.133
He argued that apparently identical cases that reached divergent
outcomes under the Restatement's approach could be explained
and distinguished on the basis of differences in their facts that
were not apparent or were not stated in the opinion. 34 He also
noted that even where the facts were not grossly different as be-
tween two cases that reached divergent results, a judge's percep-
This will not be easy doing. The rules of Offer and Acceptance have been
worked over; they have been written over; they have been shaped and rubbed
smooth with pumice, they wear the rich deep polish of a thousand class rooms;
they have a grip on the vision and indeed on the affections held by no other
rules "of law," real or pseudo.
Id. at 32.
131. Id. at 17-27.
132. "[E]ven if the lawyer surmounts such obstacles as these to a true, full synthesis, he
finds his mind riveted on law and legal obligation. . . . Preoccupation with the niceties of
doctrine almost compels such straightjacketing of interest." Llewellyn, supra note 114, at
705.
133. Llewellyn, supra note 115, at 780-83.
134. Llewellyn, supra note 127, at 17. Llewellyn also said:
Doctrine can seem to solve the problem of reexamination by setting up a pair
or more of diverse legal consequences for use in the problem situation-and let
it go at that. At which point one recalls the requisites of meaningfulness for a
rule: it must signal and sharpen the real issue, and it must give indication to
the judge as to what facts are to fall, to the counsellor indication of what facts
will fall, on either side. Any rule which merely defines a term of art in terms of
legal consequence (rather than in terms of operative fact) will, be it repeated,
remain without significance in life until it is accompanied and supplemented
by other rules which root it in the soil of fact; the same holds true of any pair
of rules which define two categories covering a field of fact, but which speak
only in terms of diverse legal consequence; or indeed of any rule which lays
down merely that one legal consequence follows from another. As soon as, and
to the extent to which, such rules acquire rooting in fact, they become well-
nigh indispensable tools for handling a complex legal life; but only then.
Id. at 28 (emphasis in original).
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tion of the facts could account for the different outcomes. 13 5 Llew-
ellyn maintained that a court's application of a legal rule or
doctrine determined the outcome of a particular case, and that this
application depended on the facts." 6 What was needed, Llewellyn
argued, was for the court to explain in the opinion the significance
of particular facts in relation to the outcome. 3 7
Emphasis on the treatment and development of fact in judicial
opinions led Llewellyn to another important insight. He perceived
that common law rules were inadequate predictors of case out-
come, not only because they emphasized doctrine, but also because
they were formulated so broadly.33 This problem occurred in
judge-made case law as well as in statutes. An example of the for-
mer was the doctrinal emphasis of the Restatement, which en-
couraged the formulation of rules of law in the broadest possible
135. See K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 26, at 60. Twining gives an excellent description of
the process:
Facts: (a) In interpreting a reported case, or in approaching a current case,
start by studying the facts as a layman familiar with their general context
might see them....
(b) Try to fit the facts into some socially significant category or pattern, sep-
arating clearly irrelevant "fireside equities" peculiar to this case from poten-
tially relevant elements in the situation. In seeking for appropriate categories
the following guidelines should be observed: (i) in categorizing the facts choose
"situational concepts"-i.e. categories which clearly refer to fact situations
only and do not straddle facts and legal consequences; (ii) terms used and dis-
tinctions drawn by persons familiar with the context of the dispute (either as
experts, observers or participants) may provide appropriate categories; (iii) the
practices and expectations of such persons may also be of use; (iv) one aspect
of the problem is to characterize the facts at an appropriate level of generality.
No general formula exists for this but: (a) the facts should be characterized as
a type; (b) in first instance, the facts should be characterized fairly narrowly
(e.g. hospital employing a doctor rather than employer-employee) and move-
ment up the ladder of abstraction to broader categories should proceed with
awareness of the dangers of lumping together disparate social situations under
one head.
W. TWINING, supra note 72, at 226-27 (footnotes omitted).
136. W. TWINING, supra note 72, at 459-60; Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality and Soci-
ety, 36 COLUM. L. REV. 699, 722-23 (1936).
137. "But what needs note is that until even the most precise of expressions about legal
consequence is guided to the facts which may emerge, the supposed role can acquire no
meaning. ... Llewellyn, supra note 127, at 13-14. See supra note 136.
138. "It is a second thesis that the concepts in vogue in Sales law are repeatedly over-
broad for intelligent use. . . ." Llewellyn, Through Title to Contract and a Bit Beyond, 15
N.Y.U. L. REV. 159, 160 (1938).
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terms. A good example of the latter was the use of the title concept
under the Uniform Sales Act.""9 Llewellyn reasoned that the title
concept employed in the Act was static.40 The concept was both
too broad and too blunt, because it lumped numerous policy
choices together.' 4' This idea that broad rules and generalizations
in contract and commercial law were unworkable is a consistent
theme in all of Llewellyn's writing and thinking about law.' In
one of his major insights, Llewellyn explained that a less sweeping
viewpoint, one that focused on exact issues and was designed to
handle particular transaction types, parties, and markets, was nec-
essary in order to satisfy the needs of commerce for an efficient
and workable commercial law. 43 Llewellyn explained:
139. Discussing the concept of title under the Uniform Sales Act, Llewellyn said:
The quarrel thus is, first, with the use of Title for purposes of decision as if the
location of Title were determinable with certainty; and second, with the insis-
tence on reaching for a single lump to solve all or most of the problems be-
tween seller and buyer-and even in regard to third parties.
Why is a one-lump Title not determinable with certainty in Sales cases? It is
because such a Title is a static concept, a something which is conceived as
continuing in somebody.
Id. at 166-67 (emphasis in original).
140. Id. at 167.
141. Id. at 171. Llewellyn explained:
[I]n Sales cases, no static concept is at home. The essence of the Sales transac-
tion is dynamic. Lump-title fits only in that rare case in which our economy
resembles that of three hundred years ago: where the whole transaction can be
accomplished at one stroke, shifting possession along with title, no strings be-
ing left behind-as in cash purchase of an overcoat worn home. But the con-
tract for sale on credit, the shifting of goods to market via a factor, the ship-
ment against draft, the installment sale, the delivery or shipment on approval,
the agreement to sell goods lying in warehouse under non-negotiable re-
ceipt-these are not one-stroke transactions .... They involve a period, often
an extended period, during which matters are in temporary suspension or are
in active flux between the parties; over considerable periods of time there is no
such Title in either party as the static picture of Title suggests. . . . But I do
not want to linger on one illustration. The important point is to see the seller-
buyer relation, save where a single stroke severs it utterly, as dynamic move-
ment to which the Whole-Title concept applies on neither side. . . . Where
the transaction proceeds in a series of lesser actions, often long-drawn-out, no
static legal whole-hog concept can fit comfortably. ...
Id. at 167-68 (emphasis in original).
142. E.g., Llewellyn, The Modern Approach to Counselling and Advocacy-Especially in
Commercial Transactions, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 167 (1946); Llewellyn, supra note 136, at 723.
143. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 457
(1930).
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What is to be striven for, if it can be produced, is some other
and different integrated base-line concept which does fit the
normality of the seller-buyer relation. I greatly doubt that such
a single concept can be produced; today I find too many kinds of
seller in contact with too many kinds of buyer in too many kinds
of transaction. But what I am clear on is that we can isolate
types, either of transaction, or of party, or of issue, and get light
on how better to deal with those types.'
One important element of his more precise focus would consist of
"problem situation thinking" and formulation of the law in terms
of the "law of the situation." 145
These terms lead to several concepts that have been a major
source of criticism of Llewellyn philosophy.146 Llewellyn frequently
used the terms "situation-sense" and "type-situation" to describe
certain factual matters or the way decisionmakers dealt with them.
Although neither of these terms was well-defined in Llewellyn's
writings, 147 he defined "type-situation" more clearly. He wrote that
in making decisions regarding factual matters,
[t]here is a sense of the type of situation to be contrasted with
the sense of a particular controversy between particular liti-
gants.... Response primarily to the sense of the particular con-
troversy is, in the first place, dangerous because a particular
controversy may not be typical, and because it is hard to disen-
tangle general sense from personalities and from "fireside"
equities ...
If on the other hand the type of situation is in the forefront of
attention, a solving rule comes in for much more thoughtful
testing and study. Rules are thrust toward reasonable simplicity,
and made with broader vision.14
144. Llewellyn, supra note 138, at 169-70 (emphasis in original).
145. Llewellyn, supra note 142, at 175. See also K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 26, at 121-57,
268-74.
146. Clark & Trubek, The Creative Role of the Judge: Restraint and Freedom in the
Common Law Tradition, 71 YALE L.J. 2255 (1961); Rohan, Common Law Tradition: Situa-
tion Sense, Subjectivism, or "Just-Result Jurisprudence'?, 32 FORDHAM L. REV. 51 (1963).
147. Clark & Trubek, supra note 146, at 260-61.
148. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 398 (1950).
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The term "type-situation" appears to be used here to mean that
in resolving factual matters, courts must take into account com-
mercial and mercantile custom, practice, and relationships. Some
years later, Llewellyn explained that the use of this "type-situa-
tion" sense helped courts create principles of law instead of re-
sponses to the personal equities of the case.149 Use of Llewellyn's
"type-situation" would also create the slightly broader princi-
ples-but not the generalities-of the common law, which Llewel-
lyn had argued were necessary in order for opinions to operate ef-
fectively as precedents. 150 Llewellyn perceived that the application
of law to facts was a crucial and a creative function of the judici-
ary, but he also argued that this application function had to recog-
nize commercial context.151
Although Llewellyn failed to define "situation-sense," in describ-
ing his sense of "immanent" law152 he explained that the "sense of
the situation as seen by the court" was a vital factor in judicial
decisionmaking.153
Situation-sense will serve well enough to indicate the type-facts
in their context and at the same time in their pressure for a
satisfying working result, coupled with whatever the judge or
court brings and adds to the evidence, in the way of knowledge
and experience and values to see with, and to judge with. 4
Although the meaning of the phrase is not entirely clear, 55 it ap-
pears that Llewellyn used the term "situation-sense" in two differ-
ent ways. First, he used it to indicate a broad policy, standard, or
149. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 26, at 402.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
153. Llewellyn, supra note 148, at 397.
154. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 26, at 60. Llewellyn amplified this brief explanation a bit:
Only as a judge or court knows the facts of life, only as they truly understand
those facts of life, only as they have it in them to rightly evaluate those facts
and to fashion rightly a sound rule and an apt remedy, can they lift the bur-
den... to uncover and to implement the immanent law."
Id. at 127 (emphasis in original). This last explanation or use of "situation sense" clearly is
meant to refer to a judge's familiarity with the context, social or business, of a controversy.
155. See Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method, 97 HARv. L. REv. 678, 699
(1984). Professor Twining also analyzed these terms and he found at least four plausible
definitions. W. TWINING, supra note 72, at 218.
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principle under which, or because of which, a court must make a
judgment.15 6 Second, he used it to refer to something remarkably
similar to the Law Merchant-also similar to his use of the phrase
"type situation"-to describe the desiderata of judicial familiarity
with commercial practices and mores, coupled with substantial re-
liance on factual context to resolve disputes. 15
Defined in this fashion, "situation-sense" is a method for evalu-
ating the facts that requires knowledge of commercial practice and
the willingness to view the facts of a particular dispute in the light
of that custom and practice.'58 This use of "situation-sense" would
enable the courts to fashion approaches to commercial disputes
which accurately reflected the intent and expectations of the par-
ties in terms of their commercial community.' 59 This view was pre-
mised on the assumption that the commercial community shared a
consensus of values, and that this consensus needed only to be
found and applied.160 Llewellyn displayed his meaning of "situa-
tion-sense" in his analysis of the opinion in a New York case, Jen-
kins v. Moyse.'6 ' In that case, the court held that a loan which on
its face appeared to violate New York's usury statute in fact did
not because the legislature had created a special device or excep-
156. W. TwINING, supra note 72, at 221. Clark and Trubek argue that choices made in this
fashion are subjective. Clark & Trubek, supra note 146, at 261.
157. Williams, The Search for Bases of Decision in Commercial Law: Llewellyn Redux,
97 HARv. L. REV. 1495 (1984).
158. Rohan, supra note 146, at 57.
159. Feinman, supra note 155, at 700.
160.
There are few branches of law which concern directly such a close-knit commu-
nity with such a wide range of agreement as to what is "right", "fair" or "rea-
sonable". It is possible to infer that, in Llewellyn's view, a "sound" decision
uncovering the "immanent law" would be one in which the judge has sufficient
experience and understanding of the usages and ethics of the particular trade
and the way this kind of transaction would be conducted and how it fitted into
the general pattern of commercial usage to be able to know what kind of solu-
tion would be likely to be deemed reasonable and acceptable by the mercantile
community. A judge in a commercial case who can see the facts in the way
businessmen would see them, as well as from the lawyer's point of view and
from the point of view of the "mores" of the community as a whole, has
grasped the "situation sense .....
W. TWINING, supra note 72, at 225.
161. 254 N.Y. 319, 172 N.E. 521 (1930). Llewellyn's analysis of the opinion appears in K.
LLEWELLYN, supra note 26, at 228.
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tion to the usury statute for corporations "for the very purpose of
letting a businessman meet the business cost of a business loan for
a prospective profit.'1 62 Llewellyn observed that the opinion was
written by a judge who "understood both real estate and business
finance.' 63 Llewellyn argued that in a close-knit community like
the commercial/mercantile community, the application of "situa-
tion-sense" by the court was useful in reaching correct, just
results.6
C. Llewellyn's Theory of Statutory Drafting and Interpretation
1. A Unique Drafting Technique
For a variety of reasons, Llewellyn developed his own unique
statutory drafting technique and used it in drafting the Code.'
One reason was Llewellyn's attempt to fashion a solution to many
of the problems of the then-current commercial law he had criti-
cized. For example, he believed that by permitting courts to give
effect to the policy, purpose, or rationale of the statutory language,
technical and complicated language could be reduced substan-
tially."'66 Language of principle, rather than rules drawn in a very
specific fashion, would eliminate this problem. The use of common
policy and purpose throughout the statute would eliminate con-
flicts and inconsistencies between various sections of the statute
and would also be of great assistance in filling any statutory gaps.
The serious problem of keeping the statute current with existing
business practice and customs could be undertaken by the courts
as they applied it. He explained his drafting method as follows:
162. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 26, at 228.
163. Id. at 228 n.225. This example and the difficulties it poses for the definition of "situ-
ation sense" are analyzed at length in Rohan, supra note 146, at 58.
164. Some analysts have severely criticized Llewellyn's use of the concept. See Clark &
Trubek, supra note 146; see also Feinman, supra note 155, at 700 n.100. "My criticism of
situation-sense focuses both on the method prescribed by Llewellyn and on the use of the
method in the cases. It appears from the opinions that, unlike Llewellyn, courts have not
always perceived the limits of the method." Id.
165. "Despite the numbers of persons involved in the drafting of the Code, the extent to
which it reflects Llewellyn's philosophy of law and his sense of commercial wisdom and need
is startling." Mentschikoff, supra note 70, at 168 n.3.
166. W. TWINING, supra note 72, at 526.
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Drafting Techniques and Policies
1. The principle of the patent reason: Every provision should
show its reason on its face. Every body of provisions should dis-
play on their face their organizing principle.
The rationale of this is that construction and application are
intellectually impossible except with reference to some reason
and theory of purpose and organization. Borderline, doubtful or
uncontemplated cases are inevitable. Reasonably uniform inter-
pretation by judges of different schooling, learning and skill is
tremendously furthered if the reason which guides application of
the same language is the same reason in all cases. A patent rea-
son, moreover, tremendously decreases the leeway open to the
skillful advocate for persuasive distortion or misapplication of
the language; it requires that any contention, to be successfully
persuasive, must make some kind of sense in terms of the rea-
son; it provides a stimulus toward, though not an assurance of,
corrective growth rather than straitjacketing of the Code by way
of case-law. 1
67
Most lawyers and judges recognize that one canon of statutory con-
struction involves seeking out the purpose of a statute in order to
resolve an ambiguity or determine how to apply or interpret provi-
sions of a statute in particular situations.""8 The use Llewellyn
made of purpose and policy in the Code, however, was far different
from their use in the old canons. Llewellyn consciously included
reason, purpose, and policy in each section as part of the major
drafting technique in the Code.16 9 Such use of purpose and policy
in an active and comprehensive fashion gave those matters a cru-
cial role in defining the meaning and the mode of application of
Code terms.
Llewellyn's use of this device was not mere coincidence. Instead,
it was a manifestation of a more general realist theory of statutory
interpretation. 17 Although Llewellyn recognized that the realists
167. Karl N. Llewellyn Papers § (J)(VI)(i)(e), at 5 (1944), reprinted in W. TWINING, supra
note 72, at 321-22 (emphasis in original).
168. Breitel, The Courts and Lawmaking, in LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TODAY AND TOMORROW
1, 22-34 (M. Paulson ed. 1959).
169. One of the principal manifestations of that effort was to put the reason or purpose of
each code section on the face of that section. Mentschikoff, supra note 70, at 170.
170. Frank, Words and Music, 47 COLUM L. REV. 1259 (1947); Llewellyn, supra note 148;
see also Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L.
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had fully developed a critique of legal process in connection with
common law cases and had suggested alternatives and improve-
ments, he argued that the realists also had to develop and imple-
ment an analogous theory of statutory interpretation.171 He ex-
plained his idea about a theory of statutory interpretation at some
length, emphasizing the need for courts to use policy and purpose
in interpreting and applying a statute and arguing that this use of
purpose and policy would help prevent courts from "eviscerating"
statutes by a "wooden and literal reading. ' 17 2 Llewellyn observed
that in interpreting statutes according to this policy or purpose
orientation, courts had to use the term policy according to two dif-
ferent meanings. One meaning included ideas "consciously before
the draftsman, the committee, the legislature," so that a court's
focus on legislative intent or policy would be "reasonably realis-
tic."' 73 The other meaning, Llewellyn observed, gained ascendancy
as a statute aged. When that occurred, the courts in interpreting
the statute would be confronted with situations that were "utterly
uncontemplated" by the language of the statute or by the drafters
at the time of enactment. 7 4 Consequently, the courts would have
to use policy and purpose to make "sense . . .of [the statute] in
the light of the new situation.' 7 5 Llewellyn saw the need for a
drafting technique that would implement his theory of statutory
interpretation. The patent reason device was an attempt to achieve
that objective.
REv. 630 (1958) (asserting that it is impossible to interpret words in a statute without know-
ing the aim of the statute); McDonnell, supra note 66 (advocating an approach to statutory
construction that identifies the statute's articulated purpose, and then interprets all the
statutory language with an eye towards that purpose).
171.
What we need to see now is that all of this is paralleled, in regard to stat-
utes, because of (1) the power of the legislature both to choose policy and to
select measures; and (2) the necessity that the legislature shall, in so doing, use
language-language fixed in particular words; and (3) the continuing duty of
the courts to make sense, under and within the law.
Llewellyn, supra note 148, at 399.
172. "Today the courts have regained, in the main, a cheerful acceptance of legislative
choice of policy, but they are still hampered to some extent in carrying such policies forward
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Llewellyn's technique of purposeful interpretation also ad-
dressed the realist concern about the role of courts in the area of
statutory interpretation. 17  The realist approach recognized the
major judicial role in applying statutes to particular cases. 17 For
Llewellyn, this approach was the antithesis of the conveyancer's
mindset or drafting technique, which consisted of drafting detailed
rules and exceptions that attempted to describe every situation
that might occur, and in which courts would merely announce
which rule or exception the particular fact situation fit into. Llew-
ellyn argued that drafting with a conveyancer's mindset in the
commercial area arose out of distrust or misunderstanding of the
courts' role, and attempted to prevent courts from exercising any
discretion at all in decisionmaking. 7 8 In place of this approach,
Llewellyn proposed to recognize the judicial discretion that in fact
exists in interpretation and application of statutes. He recognized
that the patent reason technique would produce a more "open-
ended," less detailed statute. 79 To Llewellyn, this approach more
"realistically" recognized the judicial function in interpreting and
applying statutes.
176. Id. at 399.
177. Id.
178. "Language drawn in distrust or anxiety about courts' understanding may accomplish
its immediate purpose, but it paves the way with stumbling blocks within a decade." W.
TWINING, supra note 72, at 526.
179. Mentschikoff, supra note 70, at 171. The term "open-ended," as used by Dean Ment-
schikoff, means that thi statute is drafted in terms of general principles, rather than spe-
cific, detailed rules, or that the content of statutory terms is left to the courts. An example
of the former occurs in § 2-609(1):
A contract for sale imposes an obligation on each party that the other's expec-
tation of receiving due performance will not be impaired. When reasonable
grounds for insecurity arise with respect to the performance of either party the
other may in writing demand adequate assurance of due performance and until
he receives such assurance may if commercially reasonable suspend any per-
formance for which he has not already received the agreed return.
U.C.C. § 2-609(1).
An example of the latter occurs in § 2-302(1): "If the court finds the contract or any
clause of the contract to be unconscionable it may refuse to enforce the contract or may
strike any unconscionable clauses and enforce the contract as if the stricken clause had




The Code commentary was a major part of the patent reason
device. Llewellyn argued that the use of written statutory commen-
tary was a necessary condition for the sound development of com-
mercial law by the courts, and that the purpose of a commentary
was to guide and connect the development of legal material as a
whole.180 In the earlier Uniform Acts, excessive detail in drafting
was used in an attempt to accomplish that goal. That attempt
failed, Llewellyn argued, because trial courts of varied jurisdiction
could not develop sufficient command of commercial law as a re-
sult of the press of other types of cases.""1 He maintained that a
commentary would remedy this problem by giving guidance to the
courts about the relationship of one part of the Code to another.182
More important, the comments would also show the purpose, pol-
icy, or reason for a Code section, group of sections, article, or arti-
cles. 1 83 The commentary was thus an indispensable part of Llewel-
lyn's patent reason technique, for in those situations in which the
purpose or reason of the section could not conveniently appear on
its face, the commentary would provide an explanation of its rea-
son, policy, or purpose to guide application and interpretation.18 4
Although the use and authoritativeness of the comments have been
the subject of disagreement,8 5 the comments were intended by the
drafter of the Code to assist the courts in applying and interpret-
ing commercial law, and the use of comments was an integral part
of Llewellyn's patent reason technique.
180. Llewellyn Memorandum, supra note 90, at 526.
181. Id. at 527.
182. W. TWINING, supra note 72, at 327.
183. Id.
184.
Under Subsection (2) [of the proposed Revised Sales Act] the courts are ex-
pressly authorized to consult the Comments in interpreting and applying the
principles of the Act .... Sustained effort has been made to make the reasons
and purposes of the Act apparent on the face of the text wherever possible.
The comments are further designed to state with clarity and precision the in-
tent of each section and to integrate the Act as a whole by pointing out the
relationship between one section and another.
Id.
185. Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 COLUM. L.
REv. 798, 809 (1958); Skilton, Some Comments on the Comments to the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 598.
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IV. TEXTUAL MANIFESTATIONS OF LLEWELLYN'S METHODOLOGY
The textual evidence that Llewellyn's ideas about methodology
were completely incorporated into article 2, and that they pro-
duced a new and unique type of code, is overwhelming. 86 Two
principal manifestations of interest here are manifestations of cod-
ification and manifestations of use of the patent reason device.
This section examines those textual manifestations and their
significance.
A. Manifestations of Codification
The U.C.C. possesses all the general characteristics of a code: it
is orderly, authoritative, selective, comprehensive, and unified. It
consists of ten interlocking articles, each of which deals with one
major area of the law. The first article supplies general material
and definitions that are applicable to all other articles and sections
of the statute.187 This general material consists of definitions, poli-
cies, rules of construction and application, identification of the
scope of the subject matter, and general obligations, principles,
and approaches. 8' Each individual article contains a similar set of
introductory definitions, general policies, principles, and scope.' 89
Each article in turn is divided into parts or sections that deal with
more specific subjects. 90 Moreover, within each part of each arti-
cle, the sections are often organized into groups, each of which re-
186. D. KING, THE NEW CONCEPTUALISM OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 8 (1968).
187. "Article I applies to any contract or transaction to which any other Article of this
Act applies." U.C.C. § 1-105(1).
188. E.g., id. § 1-102 ("Purposes; Rules of Construction"); id. § 1-105 ("Applicability of
the Act"); id. § 1-201 ("General Definitions"); id. § 1-203 ("Obligation of Good Faith").
Section 1-201 begins "Part 2 of Article I," and that part is captioned "General Definitions
and Principles of Interpretation." Id. § 1-201.
189. E.g., article 2 (sales), part 1, which is captioned "Short Title, General Construction
and Subject Matter." Id. § 2-101.
190. Article 2 consists of the following parts: part 1, "Short Title, General Construction
and Subject Matter"; part 2, "Form, Formation and Readjustment of Contract"; part 3,
"General Obligation and Construction of Contract"; part 4, "Title, Creditors and Good




fers to related and more specific topics in a unified, complementary
fashion.' 9 '
A high degree of correlation between rules and underlying poli-
cies is apparent throughout the various sections in each group. 192
Within each part are numerous interrelationships and cross rela-
tionships between sections93 as well as numerous relationships be-
tween sections that make up the various parts of each article.9
These features create a textured, "relational" statute.
Other relational attributes of the Code are superordination and
subordination.'95 These features are established in the Code in sev-
eral ways. For example, many sections state a general rule and
then, in the text of the same section, state an exception to the
rule. 96 Exceptions to some Code sections are stated by textual
cross-reference to other sections. 197 Subordination is also main-
tained by defining, when two or more Code sections appear to be
applicable, whether they can be cumulative. 98 When conflicts are
likely to occur between the provisions of various sections, some or
all of which are apparently applicable, the Code also contains some
provisions for resolving those conflicts.' 99 The comments suggest
191. See, e.g., id. §§ 2-313 to -315 (various warranties given by seller); id. §§ 2-316 to -318
(exclusion, modification, and inconsistency among warranties). See also id. § 2-703 (general
plan of seller's remedies); id. §§ 2-704 to -710 (specific seller's remedies).
192. Compare id. § 2-204(1) (any manner of making a contract) with id. § 2-206(1)(a)
(any reasonable acceptance), id. § 2-206(1)(b), (3) (beginning performance as reasonable ac-
ceptance), and id. § 2-207(3) (terms when contract by conduct only). For a similar sequence,
see id. § 2-711 (remedies in general), §§ 2-712 to -717 (specific remedies).
193. Compare, e.g., id. § 2-201(1) (statute of frauds) with id. § 2-209(2), (3) (statute of
frauds requirements in case of modification and waiver).
194. Compare, e.g., id. § 2-204(3) (contract with open terms) with id. § 2-305 (open price
term).
195. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
196. Compare, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (statute of frauds, general rule) with id. § 2-201(2),
(3) (exceptions to general rule); id. § 2-316(1), (2) (rules for excluding and modifying war-
ranties) with id. § 2-316(3) (modifying remedies).
197. E.g., id. § 2-314(3) (implied warranties in addition to those set forth in § 2-314 may
arise, but not if excluded under § 2-316); id. § 2-610(b) (duty of injured party in case of
anticipatory breach subject to § 2-611 on retraction of repudiation); id. § 2-611 (subject to §
2-609 on demand for assurance).
198. Compare, e.g., id. § 2-703 (seller's remedies in general) with id. §§ 2-704 to -710
(various seller's remedies).
199. Compare, e.g., id. §§ 2-313 to -315 (creation of express and implied warranties) with
id. §§ 2-316 to -317 (exclusion, modification, cumulation, and conflict of warranties); id. § 1-
102(d) (provisions of Code may be varied by agreement) with id. § 1-102(c) (Code-imposed
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further superordination and subordination, although they are not
binding. 00
B. Patent Reason Theory Manifestations
Llewellyn's patent reason theory, which was an expression of re-
alist theories of statutory interpretation, was carefully used as the
principal Code drafting device.20 ' The Code is filled with state-
ments about the use of purpose and policy in interpretation and
application. For example, section 1-102 furnishes explicit textual
evidence of the use of the patent reason theory through admoni-
tions that the principal rule of construction of the Code is to con-
strue in conformity with fundamental purposes and policies.20 2 The
language of the section is mandatory ("shall"), and it is remarka-
bly similar to Llewellyn's own explanation of the patent reason
theory.203 The section also states the underlying purposes and poli-
cies themselves.
general obligations of good faith, due diligence, commercial reasonableness, and reasonable
care may not be disclaimed).
200. The comments to virtually every section contain cross-references and definitional
cross references. E.g., id. § 2-316 comment 1:
This section is designed principally to deal with those frequent clauses in sales
contracts which seek to exclude "all warranties, express or implied." It protects
a buyer from unexpected and unbargained language of disclaimer by prohibit-
ing the disclaimer of express warranties and permitting the exclusion of im-
plied warranties only by specific language or other circumstances which protect
the buyer from surprise.
Id.
201. See supra notes 165-79 and accompanying text.
202. The text of § 1-102 provides:
(1) This Act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying
purposes and policies.
(2) Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are
(a) To simplify and modernize and develop greater precision and certainty in
the rules of law governing commercial transactions;
(b) To preserve flexibility in commercial transactions and to encourage con-
tinued expansion of commercial practices and mechanisms through custom, us-
age and agreement of the parties;
(c) To make uniform the law among various jurisdictions.
(3) In construing and applying this Act to effect its purposes, the following
rules shall apply. ..
U.C.C. § 1-102 (emphasis added).
203. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
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The comments to section 1-102 further indicate that the drafter
intended the patent reason theory to be an indispensable part of
the Code. That comment is clearly intended to be mandatory, and
its statement of the place of policy or purpose in interpreting the
Code is compelling:
The Act should be construed in accordance with its underly-
ing principles and reason. The text of each section should be
read in the light of the purpose and policy of each rule or princi-
ple, as also of the Act as a whole, and the application of the
language should be construed narrowly or broadly, as the case
may be, in conformity with the principles and policies
involved.204
The use of mandatory language throughout the comment under-
scores the drafter's view of the importance of the use of purpose
and policy in interpreting the Code.
Section 1-102 also provides that a "liberal" construction of the
Code must be employed in order to accomplish underlying policies
and purposes.20 5 The same theme is repeated in section 1-106 in
reference to remedies. 20 ' This principle of liberal construction was,
and perhaps still is, unique among American statutes. 2 7
The most authoritative source of policy in the Code is the text of
the Code itself. The clearest examples of textually stated policy
occur in article 1, which applies to all other Code articles. 8 Sec-
tion 1-102(2) explicitly states the substance of the underlying gen-
eral policies and purposes of the entire Code.20 9 They are to mod-
ernize and simplify the law, to preserve flexibility and continue the
growth of commercial law through recognition of commercial cus-
tom, usage, practice, and agreement, and to make the law uniform.
204. U.C.C. § 1-102 comment 1 (emphasis added).
205. "This Act shall be liberally construed ... ." Id. § 1-102(1).
206.
(1) The remedies provided by this Act shall be liberally administered to the
end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other
party had fully performed but neither consequential nor penal damages may
be had except as specifically provided in this Act or by other rule of law.
Id. § 1-106(1) (emphasis added).
207. W. TWINING, supra note 72, at 323.
208. "(1) Article 1 applies to any contract or transaction to which any other Article of this
Act applies." U.C.C. § 1-105(1).
209. See supra note 202.
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These policy statements are probably too general to help with
many problems of interpretation and application that arise under
the Code.210 If they were the only policy statements in the Code,
they would also create the danger of misuse, for they could be ap-
plied to argue any result in interpretation and application of the
Code. This was the very problem Llewellyn sought to solve by us-
ing the patent reason technique. 1'
Llewellyn, however, also provided more specific statements of
policy and purpose. He stated clearly that these other sources
modified and amplified the general statements in article 1.212 Llew-
ellyn himself acknowledged that this was a clear application of the
patent reason technique in drafting the Code.213 For example, sec-
tion 2-609(1) clearly articulates its policy to protect party expecta-
tions of performance.214 Sections 2-204(1) and (3) express policies
about the manner and degree of detail necessary in contract forma-
tion.215 Section 2-708 gives a measure of damages, but qualifies the
operation of the basic damages rule through giving its rationale,
which is to serve the basic policy of placing the seller in as good a
position as if the contract had been performed.216
210.
It must be noted, however, that stating that the Code is to be interpreted to
further objectives does not in itself provide a precise standard for the determi-
nation of the outcome of a particular controversy. Otherwise stated, the man-
date to interpret the Code so as to further its objectives does not furnish any
real guide to construction....
1 R. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-102:41, at 51 (3d ed.
1981).
211. D. KING, supra note 186, at 12.
212. "The text of each section should be read in the light of the purpose and policy of
each rule or principle, as also of the Act as a whole .... U.C.C. § 1-102 comment 1 (em-
phasis added).
213. "Every provision should show its reason on its face. Every body of provisions should
display on their face their organizing principle." Karl N. Llewellyn Papers, supra note 167.
214. "A contract for sale imposes an obligation on each party that the other's expectation
of receiving due performance will not be impaired .... U.C.C. § 2-609(1).
215.
(1) A contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show
agreement. ...
(3) Even though one or more terms are left open a contract for sale does not
fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and there
is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy.
Id. § 2-204.
216. Section 2-708 provides:
[Vol. 29:341
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In addition to express textual statements of policy and purpose,
many other Code sections clearly indicate their policy and pur-
pose.21 Article 2 is filled with sections in which the drafter used
this device. For example, section 2-316(1) on exclusion and modifi-
cation of warranties strongly implies that Code policy is, wherever
possible, to preserve express warranties. 18 Sections 2-703219 and 2-
711220 indicate the organizing principles, policies, and purposes of
sellers' and buyers' remedies. The best example of policy clearly
implied by the text of the Code occurs in those sections that deal
with the rights and obligations of merchants. Section 2-104(1) de-
fines the term "merchant""22 and section 2-104(3) defines the term
The measure of damages for non-acceptance is the difference between the
price current at the time and place for tender and the unpaid contract price
together with any incidental damages. . . but less any expense saved in conse-
quence of the buyer's breach, except that if the foregoing measure of damages
is inadequate to put the seller in as good a position as performance would have
done then the measure of damages is the profit (including reasonable over-
head) which the seller would have made from full performance by the buyer.
Id. § 2-708 (emphasis added). The examples of explicit textual statements of policy given
here are merely illustrative, not exhaustive.
217. See supra note 167 and accompanying text, in which Llewellyn recommends this
drafting device.
218. "If the agreement creates an express warranty, words disclaiming it are inoperative."
U.C.C. § 2-316(1).
219. Section 2-703 provides:
Where the buyer wrongfully rejects or revokes acceptance of goods or fails to
make a payment due on or before deliver or repudiates with respect to a part
or the whole, then with respect to any goods directly affected and, if the breach
is of the whole contract (Section 2-612), then also with respect to the whole
undelivered balance, the aggrieved seller may. ...
Id. § 2-703.
220. Section 7-111 provides:
(1) Where the seller fails to make delivery or repudiates or the buyer rightfully
rejects or justifiably revokes acceptance then with respect to any goods in-
volved, and with respect to the whole if the breach goes to the whole contract
(section 2-612), the buyer may cancel and whether or not he has done so may
in addition to recovering so much of the price as has been paid. ...
(2) Where the seller fails to deliver or repudiates the buyer may also. ...
Id. § 2-711.
221. Section 2-104(1) defines "merchant":
"Merchant" means a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his
occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the prac-
tices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill
may be attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other intermedi-
ary who by his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill.
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"between merchants." '222 A group of succeeding sections imposes
special duties on merchants.2 23 The unmistakable implication is
that merchants are held to a different, higher duty than
nonmerchants in transactions governed by the Code.224
Another source of policy and purpose statements is the Code
comments.125 The best evidence of the policy orientation of the
comments comes from reading them, for the text of the comments
themselves is focused almost entirely on the purpose and policy of
the statutory material they explain. 2 6 The comments also contain
Id. § 2-104(1).
222. "'Between merchants' means in any transaction with respect to which both parties
are chargeable with the knowledge or skill of merchants." Id. § 2-104(3).
223. Section 2-201(2) imposes the following duties:
Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the
contract and sufficient against the sender is received and the party receiving it
has reason to know its contents, it satisfies the requirements of subsection (1)
against such party unless written notice of objection to its contents is given
within ten days after it is received.
Id. § 2-201(2).
An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a signed writing which gives
assurance that it will be held open needs no consideration to be irrevocable for
a reasonable time or during a stated time but in no event for a time exceeding
three months; but such term on a form supplied by the offeree must be sepa-
rately signed by the offeror.
Id. § 2-205.
224. Twining quotes Llewellyn:
An alternative technique to explicit statements of purpose "consists in making
the purpose of a provision appear on its face by the choice of language and by
the organization of the thought in the light of the situation."
This can be illustrated by reference to the special provisions concerning
merchants in Article 2 .... The reason for this is that those who hold them-
selves out as having knowledge or skills peculiar to practices involved in a
transaction, on the one hand need less protection from formalities and on the
other hand should not be allowed to take advantage of the ignorance or lack of
skill of others . ..
W. TwINING, supra note 72, at 324-25 (quoting Karl N. Llewellyn Papers, supra note 167, §
(J)(VI)(i)(e), at 6).
225. See supra notes 181-185 and accompanying text.
226. The statutory text and comments contain many cross references concerning policy,
and many comments are concerned specifically with the purpose of the section. See U.C.C.
§§ 2-205 comment 2 ("The primary purpose of this section is. . . "), 2-317 comment 1
("The present section rests on the basic policy of this Article. . . ."), 2-403 comment 1
("The basic policy of our law allowing transfer of such title as the transferor has .. "),
2-509 comment 1 ("The underlying theory of these sections on risk of loss is. . . ."), 2-605
comment 1 ("The present section rests upon a policy of. . . ."), 2-712 comment 3 ("Subsec-
tion (3) expresses the policy that. . . ."). In other comments that do not deal specifically
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numerous references to the Code's changes in purposes and poli-
cies from the old Uniform Acts.227 In spite of the speculation over
the authoritativeness of the comments, clearly they were an inte-
gral part of the patent reason device incorporated into the Code.
The textual manifestations of the patent reason theory in the
Code establish that this was in fact the principal device Llewelyn
used in drafting. His general statements in article 1 are virtual re-
statements of this theory.22 s He expressly used policy and purpose
consistently throughout the Code in the text and comments; these
statements were general and specific, in order to provide guidance;
and when the policy or purpose was not express, it was clearly
implied.
V. CONCLUSION
Judicial decisions have largely ignored the realist methodology
that Karl N. Llewellyn incorporated into the Code.229 The failure
of the courts to follow a uniform method of interpretation and ap-
plication of the Code has been a major cause of nonuniformity or
inconsistency in Code decisions. Llewellyn understood the difficul-
ties of statutory interpretation and realized that courts would be
unwilling to give up ingrained methods of interpreting statutes. He
attempted to resolve these problems by using two devices in tan-
dem in drafting the Code-the code form and the patent reason
drafting technique. These devices grew out of his efforts to analyze
past statutory interpretational methodology and its inadequacies,
and to produce a realist theory of statutory interpretation. Llewel-
lyn attempted to accomplish a critique of existing statutory inter-
pretational methodology and to generate a constructive new theory
with policy, the discussion almost invariably is framed as an explanation of statutory pur-
pose or policy. E.g., id. §§ 2-104 comment 1 ("[This Article] thus adopts a policy .... ),
2-206 comment 1 ("This section is intended to remain flexible and its applicability to be
enlarged ... ."), 2-305 comment 6 ("Throughout the entire section, the purpose is .... ),
2-507 comment 1 ("Subsection (1) continues the policies of the prior uniform statutory pro-
visions... [b]ut the provisions of this subsection must be read within the framework of the
other sections of this Article which bear upon the question .... ).
227. For example, the following Code sections all bear comments titled "Purposes of
Changes" or "Purposes of Changes and New Matter": id. §§ 2-102, -103, -201, -304, -402,
-505, -607, -702.
228. See supra notes 202-207 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 28-68 and accompanying text.
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to replace or improve it. His effort was deliberately analogous to
the analysis and suggestions made by the legal realists in connec-
tion with the judicial process in nonstatutory cases, in which the
courts construed pure case precedent. He employed these two de-
vices within his own realist framework. The assumptions of legal
realism thus were major influences in the drafting of the Code.
Many implications for Code interpretational methodology flow
from the use of the patent reason device and the code form. First,
the use of the code form has significance for interpretation. A de-
bate has raged over the differences between continental methods of
interpreting a code and the common law methods of interpreting a
statute. a Without regard for any of the systemic or theoretic con-
siderations urged in that debate, however, the mere use of the code
form leads to several unavoidable methodological requirements.
These requirements are inherent in the code form itself.
The Code was drafted as an integrated, unified whole. This
drafting philosophy led to extensive cross-references and relation-
ships among the text and comments of the various sections, parts,
groups of sections, and articles. Code methodology must recognize
this textual unity. In interpreting and applying the Code, the usual
focus should not be on single sections viewed in isolation. Because
of the integrated code approach, many terms, concepts, definitions,
principles, and rules explain and supplement each other. As a re-
sult, examination of a concept, rule, or policy must involve the use
and relationship of that concept in the several contexts in which it
appears: in the context of the usually related group of sections in
which it appears;231 in the wider context of the Code part in which
it appears; 23 2 in the context of general obligations, rights, and poli-
cies imposed by the Code;2 33 and in the context of the other sec-
tions that, although in different parts of the Code, nevertheless re-
230. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
231. For example, the related sections will often use similar approaches to a similar but
not identical problem, or else use the same term to resolve a similar problem, which of
course sheds light on the meaning of the section being construed or applied.
232. For example, the introduction to each part usually indicates the problems it seeks to
resolve and provides definitions, an approach, and the general policy sought to be imple-
mented or promoted.
233. The drafter used several general terms to modify the entire Code or a whole part. An
example of the former principle is the obligation of good faith imposed on all performance
under the Code; an example of the latter is the injunction that all remedies are to be liber-
[Vol. 29:341
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fer to the section being construed or to a closely related concept. 3 4
Although these observations seem obvious, many courts and com-
mentators still refuse to acknowledge them.
Second, the use of the patent reason technique in drafting the
Code has profound implications for Code interpretational method-
ology. The real importance of the patent reason technique is ap-
parent when the interpreter compares the Code approach to the
use of policy with the use that legislatures and courts ordinarily
make of statutory policy. Legislatures commonly incorporate a
general statement of purpose, policy, or reason into the preamble
or definitional part of a statute. Courts may then use these general
statements in interpreting the statute. In the Code's patent reason
technique, however, Llewellyn used purpose and policy in a totally
different fashion. In drafting the Code, Llewellyn continuously and
consistently employed policy and purpose as the central device to
convey and clarify statutory meaning. As a result, purpose, policy,
and reason are major determinants of what the language of the
text means. This active use of policy should be contrasted with the
use made of policy as part of a canon of construction when courts
construe a typical, noncode statute.
The patent reason principle also assigns a definite role to the
courts in interpreting and applying the open-ended principles of
the Code. Llewellyn used the patent reason technique because of
his realist understanding of the judicial process of statutory inter-
pretation. He recognized that the courts have some leeway in inter-
preting a statute. He also recognized that this leeway is similar to
the latitude courts employ in using case precedents in decisions
that do not involve a statute. His objective was to give guidance to
courts in exercising this leeway. 35 The patent reason concept in
the Code thus embodies realist theory about the way courts
function.
ally construed to place the aggrieved party in the position in which he would have been if
the sales contract had been performed.
234. For example, compare the general statute of frauds (U.C.C. § 2-201(1)) with the spe-
cial statutes of frauds for orders between merchants (§ 2-201(2)) or for modifications of
contracts (§ 2-209).
235. In describing the patent reason technique, Llewellyn took the position that only
"[r]easonably uniform interpretation" was possible. Karl Llewellyn Papers, supra note 167.
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In terms of the present discussion, courts using the Code need
not share Llewellyn's realist beliefs about their role and function in
order to use the patent reason methodology. The important point
is that Llewellyn's understanding of the judicial process led him to
draft in the language of principle and to use policy, purpose, and
reason to convey meaning. Faced with that statutory architecture,
courts should not and probably cannot avoid using policy and pur-
pose in interpreting the Code.2 36
Courts would be unwise, furthermore, to avoid the methodologi-
cal implications that flow from Llewellyn's creation of this judicial
role. First, as suggested throughout this Article, the leeway created
by Llewellyn's open-ended drafting must be guided by judicial use
of the web of interlocking textual concepts built into the code
structure and form. An important corollary of this principle is the
idea that courts should not automatically revert to the concepts
and methods of the common law when the statutory text is not
self-applying or does not yield a precise rule. Nor should courts
automatically resort to the plain meaning of a statute or the dic-
tionary meaning of a word. Llewellyn's drafting device recognizes
the leeway that courts in fact exercised in choosing earlier statu-
tory interpretational devices, realistically preserves it for the
courts, but attempts to channel it to produce uniformity and
consistency.
Although commentators have complained about lack of uniform-
ity in Code decisions since its enactment, they have also demon-
strated little understanding of the procedural and methodological
devices used to construct the Code.37 The combination of realist
jurisprudence and Llewellyn's drafting techniques resulted in a to-
tally unique product that is, perhaps, the first "realist" statute.
Use of policy, purpose, and reason in interpreting the Code accord-
ing to the drafter's design, along with use of a relational approach
to interpretation, which the code form inherently requires, will go
far to produce the uniform results Llewellyn sought.
236. "The rationale for this is that construction and application are intellectually impos-
sible except with reference to some reason and theory of purpose and organization." Id.
(emphasis in original).
237. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
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